Election week is done. It's time to get back to the business of finding real solutions for our nation's economic recovery. As this week ends it is clear that the appetite for federal stimuli is beginning its ebb tide. We see the Federal Reserve playing the risky cards of quantitative easing trying yet again to spark an economic recovery against the odds of a main street economy still mired in the collateral damage of central government's past grand visions.
Don't get me wrong. I actually agree that Fed needs to be doing what it is. We need to find a sustainable balance for our economy and it's a data intensive compass that can only be seen with clarity from the offices occupied by people like Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner and Sheila Bair. What I do worry about though is that these central solutions too often take from the small and give to the big because the simplifying assumptions used by the economists and statisticians that support the process aren't capable of seeing the one-by-one trench warfare fights being fought by small businesses and individuals. It's an inherent policy formulation weakness of the academic brain trust behind our system that may be costing ordinary people more pain than necessary. But these ordinary Americans are there. We know this because they voted on Tuesday.
Fortunately, the United States is a big country and Washington D.C. isn't the only place exploring ways to find economic recovery formulae. Across the country, cities and states are beginning to chart independent paths to creating their own "islands of recovery". The City of Los Angeles' proposed Responsible Banking Ordinance continues to move through the committee process improving bit-by-bit into what I believe is an important emerging economic policy counterweight to ensure that the "small to big" tendencies of central solutions do not take us astray yet again.
The tale of the tape is something I believe worth sharing with the readers of the Huffington Post.
On October 26th, there was a public hearing by the L.A. City Jobs Committee chaired by Councilman Richard Alarcon on item CF 09-0234, Responsible Banking. The measure was approved with a number of questions to be investigated and reported to a hearing of the L.A. City Budget and Finance Committee to take place on Monday, November 8th. The questions aired by Councilman Bernard Parks focused on two areas. He asked for more information to determine if the cost and design of the process for implementation by the City was indeed workable. He also asked for clarification about how the differences between community banks, large complex banks and the city's debt underwriters would be recognized within the final ordinance.
Mr. Park's questions tell me that the L.A. process is indeed making progress because these are no longer questions about whether this a good thing for the economic interests of the City but rather how well is the plan risk managed. The interests behind the initiative become more positive as banks, large and small, begin to recognize that there is opportunity to be had here. The carrot being offered by the City of L.A is preference to win lucrative contracts that the City will be issuing anyway if evidence can be presented by the bidders that they are placing the interests of the region higher up the business priority list than their competition. It's subtle and far reaching in its potential to encourage money to circulate locally longer.
So now to ponder details,
As I reviewed the current version of the ordinance draft, it was clear the that City of Los Angeles had specified a data collection and reporting request that seeks to get banks to translate the nature of their business activities into measurement language that city governments can understand. The policy question is actually spot on but I'm also pretty sure that asking a bank to deliver the answer on a silver platter to the city first time out is a bit of a stretch. I think there's a better way to make it work for everyone and bring the cost/risk of the process well into good comfort.
The path to success here is to recognize two things. The first is that banks know how to report data to their regulators. They actually track all the information the city wants to know. Once a year they even have to report data to the granularity of branch-by-branch information to the FDIC. The other thing that's clear from the city draft is that municipal governments analyze their quality of service based on census tracts because that's how voters are bucketed. The trick in getting one system to talk to the other is to leverage by translating between the two universes via the zip codes of the U.S. postal service.
Asking the banks to do all the work is a lot of work. But if the City of Los Angeles were to re-design the ordinance implementation process to be a two step process where the banks report data in branches with identification of which zip codes are affected by that branch and there was a post- process by the City to morph the submittals into census tract visibility I think this would actually work reasonably well. City employees and/or other specialty vendors are more knowledgeable about the second step of the transformation than any bank will ever be. And there's a reason for that. Bankers, being lenders, have been discouraged from doing the second step for a long time because the technology that does so equates to gathering the data to do "red lining". So it's actually a better plan for the City of L.A. to deliberately separate these two steps from each other in its ordinance design.
My point here is that by taking a step back and recognizing where natural divisions of skill can be used to complement each other what seems onerous as an all-in-one data request can quickly become very doable.
This gets us to Mr. Park's second inquiry about larger out of area institutions and debt underwriters seeking to do business with the City. To that my observation is that the City of Los Angeles needs to set up a fair playing field for everyone. It's my read that by combining the suggestion above for banks with local branches with the tenets of the current ordinance draft language requesting distilled data into zip codes there's plenty of wiggle room for presentation of evidence of local involvement by these larger institutions, even those that do not have physical branches in the region. Complex transforms of data to support reporting requests are well within the capabilities of the IT departments of these larger businesses. Bearing in mind that these are also the banks that will go after the largest contracts with the City there's plenty of incentive for them to get their systems to produce the reports that will give them an advantage over competing bidders.
And in the long run I'm not just talking about competing just for L.A.'s business. There's a far larger universe of municipal and state government opportunities out there and I'll remind the readers of the Huffington post to look back at the history of my blogs for the one reporting on Bill Lockyer's inquiry earlier this year to the largest municipal bond underwriters.
I mean does anyone really think that the rest of America's League of Cities isn't watching how this plays out? Or that incoming California Governor Jerry Brown, the former Mayor of Oakland, doesn't already know that Los Angeles, San Jose and other cities in California are actively exploring how to affect the future of the State's economy using local strategies? Or that Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, Sheila Bair and Barack Obama won't read about this?
Keep going L.A. La-La Land may yet become the next shining star of economic recovery innovation.
To support a margin compression theory, the article begins by using institutional selling as proof and presents increasing Android market share as an argument. Let’s take a closer look.
1. Institutional Selling
The two examples provided (one institution selling and another expressing worry) are insufficient to support the conclusion that big money has started to dump Apple. What’s happening in the aggregate? Might other institutions have initiated positions or increased their holdings? Unless this table (http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/holdings.asp?symbol=AAPL&selected=AAPL&FormType=Institutional) is out of date (It does include Capital Growth Management’s sale.), there is no significant net change in the number of shares held by institutions.
Now, one could argue that CGM’s Heebner and FEAM’s Obuchowski are such stellar managers that their opinion warrants special attention. Well, Heebner’s CGM Focus fund is only a two-star Morningstar rated fund (http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=CGMFX+Profile). Heebner “knows how to count”, as the author writes, I suppose, but he doesn’t know how to outperform; Obuchowski’s FEAM50 (http://www.1empiream.com/FEAM50_Q3%2010.pdf) and APA125 (http://www.1empiream.com/apa.htm) funds have beaten their benchmark. However, he’s expressed concern about holding Apple two years from now. He hasn’t sold yet.
The article hence doesn’t provide either quantitative (as the number of shares held has not changed significantly) or qualitative (as no star manager is cited as selling) evidence of big money starting to dump Apple because of margin compression. For the one under performing manager cited for selling, no reason is provided. As a matter of fact, there’s no evidence for net institutional selling of Apple, period.
2. Increased Android Market Share
With a 35% profit share in 2009 (http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-revenue-vs-operating-pro...), the hardware industry's highest, hasn’t Apple been successful in the personal computer market? I would say so, and yet it had only captured a 7% market share. How has it accomplished this feat? By offering something different that consumers value at a premium.
The author writes: “Jobs also (understandably) failed to mention that the “commodity’ Androids materially outperform the iOS products in terms of features and functionality. This is pretty much in direct contravention to the concept of the term “commodity”, isn’t it???? I don’t think many Samsung Galaxy S, Droid X or HTC Evo owners will characterize their devices as “commodities”.”
A product’s characterization as a commodity is not a function of the quality of its features and functionality or user opinions thereof. The Android clones are commodities because there’s fundamentally little difference between them. One might have a bigger screen, another longer battery life, and yet another a thinner form factor, but they all run the same OS and hence offer the same functionality. If an innovative feature proves popular, it can quickly be duplicated. There’s little that sets one phone apart from the other. They are interchangeable. As such, they must compete on price. You might prefer the Galaxy S, but settle for a Droid if its price is sufficiently lower to sway you. Their makers will generate lower profit margins, just like Windows PC makers.
The iPhone, on the other hand, offers something different: superior aesthetics, greater ease of use, no bloatware, superior integration with related products (Mac & iPad), a certain prestige, but mainly a distinct OS. It offers the whole package. Its hardware competitors might best or equal some features, but not the whole. If you value this different product, you can only buy from Apple. By maintaining full control of the iPhone experience, Apple prevents it from becoming a commodity like all the Android clones and, so long as it’s able to produce a superior experience on the whole, ensures premium pricing and high profit margins.
The author also writes: “…its business model may prove unassailable unless Apple makes some drastic changes (ex. allowing cloning)…”
What if Apple did pursue the Google model and licensed its OS? If it allowed iOS clones, it would cannibalize its sales and its margins would be obliterated, as it would lose its main differentiator. Would it be able to keep generating a $238 profit per phone (http://www.asymco.com/2010/10/31/making-it-up-in-volume-how-to-view-unit-profitability-vs-volume-in-handsets/)? In light of the fact that Google is giving Android away, it’s highly unlikely.
Android has already won. The battle for market or unit share, that is. Apple will henceforth never sell as many phones. That’s OK because Apple will probably keep generating the lion’s share of profits (http://www.asymco.com/2010/10/30/last-quarter-apple-gained-4-unit-share-22-sales-value-share-and-48-of-profit-share/) by executing a business model proven successful with the Mac.
As it reaches critical mass, Google’s model might indeed become unassailable. No other company will beat Google at its game. Apple has chosen to play a different game that might also be unassailable. They’re two different ways to win. Google will attempt to monetize Android through market share dominance, while Apple will maintain its profit share dominance among hardware makers through innovation and differentiation. Apple’s margins will suffer significantly only if it’s unable to keep offering something different, valued at a premium by consumers.
In short, the article fails to show an institutional dump of Apple shares. It doesn’t even show that the one (marginally competent) institutional manager mentioned for selling did so because of expected margin compression. Moreover, it is misguided in using Android’s unit share dominance to deduce margin compression at Apple. Apple’s profit margin will only suffer significant compression if it fails in the execution of its business model.
To further the analysis, is Google’s licensing model superior to Apple’s integrated model, as many seem to believe? In the personal computer market, Microsoft made money by selling Windows to hardware makers. In the mobile phone market, Google is giving Android away, while planning to monetize market share dominance through services (search and others). The hurdles it faces with this model are not insignificant. Its lack of control over its OS is a liability: witness Verizon’s pre-installation of Bing on some Android phones (http://www.broadbandreports.com/shownews/Verizon-Bing-Wont-Be-Exclusive-On-All-Android-Phones-110294). Its platform is a customizable OS that hardware makers and wireless carriers can tailor to suit their own ends, which may be to Google’s detriment, and they don’t have to pay for it. Its success is far from assured. Might Google be going back to producing its own branded phone because its current strategy is proving difficult to monetize (http://www.engadget.com/2010/11/11/this-is-the-nexus-s/)?
Apple, on the other hand, is already monetizing the iPhone. As a matter of fact, it made as much money in Q3 2010 as all other phone makers combined (http://www.asymco.com/2010/10/30/last-quarter-apple-gained-4-unit-share-22-sales-value-share-and-48-of-profit-share/), in spite of commanding only 4% market share. Apple won both the unit share and profit share battle in MP3 players with the iPod, as no worthy competitor came forth. This is not the case in smart phones with the emergence of Android. Nonetheless, the Mac, with 35% of PC profit share in spite of only 7% market share, has proven that Apple’s model can thrive even in the face of strong competition.
bench_craft_companyYour daily cup of Orange and Blue Coffee - Horse Tracks.
Read our news of Jade Raymond making Splinter Cell 6.
Jonathon Shuler has published a post exploring the News Diamond from my Model for a 21st Century Newsroom. As part of that he's added an extra layer to th...
bench_craft_companyYour daily cup of Orange and Blue Coffee - Horse Tracks.
Read our news of Jade Raymond making Splinter Cell 6.
Jonathon Shuler has published a post exploring the News Diamond from my Model for a 21st Century Newsroom. As part of that he's added an extra layer to th...
bench_craft_company Election week is done. It's time to get back to the business of finding real solutions for our nation's economic recovery. As this week ends it is clear that the appetite for federal stimuli is beginning its ebb tide. We see the Federal Reserve playing the risky cards of quantitative easing trying yet again to spark an economic recovery against the odds of a main street economy still mired in the collateral damage of central government's past grand visions.
Don't get me wrong. I actually agree that Fed needs to be doing what it is. We need to find a sustainable balance for our economy and it's a data intensive compass that can only be seen with clarity from the offices occupied by people like Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner and Sheila Bair. What I do worry about though is that these central solutions too often take from the small and give to the big because the simplifying assumptions used by the economists and statisticians that support the process aren't capable of seeing the one-by-one trench warfare fights being fought by small businesses and individuals. It's an inherent policy formulation weakness of the academic brain trust behind our system that may be costing ordinary people more pain than necessary. But these ordinary Americans are there. We know this because they voted on Tuesday.
Fortunately, the United States is a big country and Washington D.C. isn't the only place exploring ways to find economic recovery formulae. Across the country, cities and states are beginning to chart independent paths to creating their own "islands of recovery". The City of Los Angeles' proposed Responsible Banking Ordinance continues to move through the committee process improving bit-by-bit into what I believe is an important emerging economic policy counterweight to ensure that the "small to big" tendencies of central solutions do not take us astray yet again.
The tale of the tape is something I believe worth sharing with the readers of the Huffington Post.
On October 26th, there was a public hearing by the L.A. City Jobs Committee chaired by Councilman Richard Alarcon on item CF 09-0234, Responsible Banking. The measure was approved with a number of questions to be investigated and reported to a hearing of the L.A. City Budget and Finance Committee to take place on Monday, November 8th. The questions aired by Councilman Bernard Parks focused on two areas. He asked for more information to determine if the cost and design of the process for implementation by the City was indeed workable. He also asked for clarification about how the differences between community banks, large complex banks and the city's debt underwriters would be recognized within the final ordinance.
Mr. Park's questions tell me that the L.A. process is indeed making progress because these are no longer questions about whether this a good thing for the economic interests of the City but rather how well is the plan risk managed. The interests behind the initiative become more positive as banks, large and small, begin to recognize that there is opportunity to be had here. The carrot being offered by the City of L.A is preference to win lucrative contracts that the City will be issuing anyway if evidence can be presented by the bidders that they are placing the interests of the region higher up the business priority list than their competition. It's subtle and far reaching in its potential to encourage money to circulate locally longer.
So now to ponder details,
As I reviewed the current version of the ordinance draft, it was clear the that City of Los Angeles had specified a data collection and reporting request that seeks to get banks to translate the nature of their business activities into measurement language that city governments can understand. The policy question is actually spot on but I'm also pretty sure that asking a bank to deliver the answer on a silver platter to the city first time out is a bit of a stretch. I think there's a better way to make it work for everyone and bring the cost/risk of the process well into good comfort.
The path to success here is to recognize two things. The first is that banks know how to report data to their regulators. They actually track all the information the city wants to know. Once a year they even have to report data to the granularity of branch-by-branch information to the FDIC. The other thing that's clear from the city draft is that municipal governments analyze their quality of service based on census tracts because that's how voters are bucketed. The trick in getting one system to talk to the other is to leverage by translating between the two universes via the zip codes of the U.S. postal service.
Asking the banks to do all the work is a lot of work. But if the City of Los Angeles were to re-design the ordinance implementation process to be a two step process where the banks report data in branches with identification of which zip codes are affected by that branch and there was a post- process by the City to morph the submittals into census tract visibility I think this would actually work reasonably well. City employees and/or other specialty vendors are more knowledgeable about the second step of the transformation than any bank will ever be. And there's a reason for that. Bankers, being lenders, have been discouraged from doing the second step for a long time because the technology that does so equates to gathering the data to do "red lining". So it's actually a better plan for the City of L.A. to deliberately separate these two steps from each other in its ordinance design.
My point here is that by taking a step back and recognizing where natural divisions of skill can be used to complement each other what seems onerous as an all-in-one data request can quickly become very doable.
This gets us to Mr. Park's second inquiry about larger out of area institutions and debt underwriters seeking to do business with the City. To that my observation is that the City of Los Angeles needs to set up a fair playing field for everyone. It's my read that by combining the suggestion above for banks with local branches with the tenets of the current ordinance draft language requesting distilled data into zip codes there's plenty of wiggle room for presentation of evidence of local involvement by these larger institutions, even those that do not have physical branches in the region. Complex transforms of data to support reporting requests are well within the capabilities of the IT departments of these larger businesses. Bearing in mind that these are also the banks that will go after the largest contracts with the City there's plenty of incentive for them to get their systems to produce the reports that will give them an advantage over competing bidders.
And in the long run I'm not just talking about competing just for L.A.'s business. There's a far larger universe of municipal and state government opportunities out there and I'll remind the readers of the Huffington post to look back at the history of my blogs for the one reporting on Bill Lockyer's inquiry earlier this year to the largest municipal bond underwriters.
I mean does anyone really think that the rest of America's League of Cities isn't watching how this plays out? Or that incoming California Governor Jerry Brown, the former Mayor of Oakland, doesn't already know that Los Angeles, San Jose and other cities in California are actively exploring how to affect the future of the State's economy using local strategies? Or that Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, Sheila Bair and Barack Obama won't read about this?
Keep going L.A. La-La Land may yet become the next shining star of economic recovery innovation.
To support a margin compression theory, the article begins by using institutional selling as proof and presents increasing Android market share as an argument. Let’s take a closer look.
1. Institutional Selling
The two examples provided (one institution selling and another expressing worry) are insufficient to support the conclusion that big money has started to dump Apple. What’s happening in the aggregate? Might other institutions have initiated positions or increased their holdings? Unless this table (http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/holdings.asp?symbol=AAPL&selected=AAPL&FormType=Institutional) is out of date (It does include Capital Growth Management’s sale.), there is no significant net change in the number of shares held by institutions.
Now, one could argue that CGM’s Heebner and FEAM’s Obuchowski are such stellar managers that their opinion warrants special attention. Well, Heebner’s CGM Focus fund is only a two-star Morningstar rated fund (http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=CGMFX+Profile). Heebner “knows how to count”, as the author writes, I suppose, but he doesn’t know how to outperform; Obuchowski’s FEAM50 (http://www.1empiream.com/FEAM50_Q3%2010.pdf) and APA125 (http://www.1empiream.com/apa.htm) funds have beaten their benchmark. However, he’s expressed concern about holding Apple two years from now. He hasn’t sold yet.
The article hence doesn’t provide either quantitative (as the number of shares held has not changed significantly) or qualitative (as no star manager is cited as selling) evidence of big money starting to dump Apple because of margin compression. For the one under performing manager cited for selling, no reason is provided. As a matter of fact, there’s no evidence for net institutional selling of Apple, period.
2. Increased Android Market Share
With a 35% profit share in 2009 (http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-revenue-vs-operating-pro...), the hardware industry's highest, hasn’t Apple been successful in the personal computer market? I would say so, and yet it had only captured a 7% market share. How has it accomplished this feat? By offering something different that consumers value at a premium.
The author writes: “Jobs also (understandably) failed to mention that the “commodity’ Androids materially outperform the iOS products in terms of features and functionality. This is pretty much in direct contravention to the concept of the term “commodity”, isn’t it???? I don’t think many Samsung Galaxy S, Droid X or HTC Evo owners will characterize their devices as “commodities”.”
A product’s characterization as a commodity is not a function of the quality of its features and functionality or user opinions thereof. The Android clones are commodities because there’s fundamentally little difference between them. One might have a bigger screen, another longer battery life, and yet another a thinner form factor, but they all run the same OS and hence offer the same functionality. If an innovative feature proves popular, it can quickly be duplicated. There’s little that sets one phone apart from the other. They are interchangeable. As such, they must compete on price. You might prefer the Galaxy S, but settle for a Droid if its price is sufficiently lower to sway you. Their makers will generate lower profit margins, just like Windows PC makers.
The iPhone, on the other hand, offers something different: superior aesthetics, greater ease of use, no bloatware, superior integration with related products (Mac & iPad), a certain prestige, but mainly a distinct OS. It offers the whole package. Its hardware competitors might best or equal some features, but not the whole. If you value this different product, you can only buy from Apple. By maintaining full control of the iPhone experience, Apple prevents it from becoming a commodity like all the Android clones and, so long as it’s able to produce a superior experience on the whole, ensures premium pricing and high profit margins.
The author also writes: “…its business model may prove unassailable unless Apple makes some drastic changes (ex. allowing cloning)…”
What if Apple did pursue the Google model and licensed its OS? If it allowed iOS clones, it would cannibalize its sales and its margins would be obliterated, as it would lose its main differentiator. Would it be able to keep generating a $238 profit per phone (http://www.asymco.com/2010/10/31/making-it-up-in-volume-how-to-view-unit-profitability-vs-volume-in-handsets/)? In light of the fact that Google is giving Android away, it’s highly unlikely.
Android has already won. The battle for market or unit share, that is. Apple will henceforth never sell as many phones. That’s OK because Apple will probably keep generating the lion’s share of profits (http://www.asymco.com/2010/10/30/last-quarter-apple-gained-4-unit-share-22-sales-value-share-and-48-of-profit-share/) by executing a business model proven successful with the Mac.
As it reaches critical mass, Google’s model might indeed become unassailable. No other company will beat Google at its game. Apple has chosen to play a different game that might also be unassailable. They’re two different ways to win. Google will attempt to monetize Android through market share dominance, while Apple will maintain its profit share dominance among hardware makers through innovation and differentiation. Apple’s margins will suffer significantly only if it’s unable to keep offering something different, valued at a premium by consumers.
In short, the article fails to show an institutional dump of Apple shares. It doesn’t even show that the one (marginally competent) institutional manager mentioned for selling did so because of expected margin compression. Moreover, it is misguided in using Android’s unit share dominance to deduce margin compression at Apple. Apple’s profit margin will only suffer significant compression if it fails in the execution of its business model.
To further the analysis, is Google’s licensing model superior to Apple’s integrated model, as many seem to believe? In the personal computer market, Microsoft made money by selling Windows to hardware makers. In the mobile phone market, Google is giving Android away, while planning to monetize market share dominance through services (search and others). The hurdles it faces with this model are not insignificant. Its lack of control over its OS is a liability: witness Verizon’s pre-installation of Bing on some Android phones (http://www.broadbandreports.com/shownews/Verizon-Bing-Wont-Be-Exclusive-On-All-Android-Phones-110294). Its platform is a customizable OS that hardware makers and wireless carriers can tailor to suit their own ends, which may be to Google’s detriment, and they don’t have to pay for it. Its success is far from assured. Might Google be going back to producing its own branded phone because its current strategy is proving difficult to monetize (http://www.engadget.com/2010/11/11/this-is-the-nexus-s/)?
Apple, on the other hand, is already monetizing the iPhone. As a matter of fact, it made as much money in Q3 2010 as all other phone makers combined (http://www.asymco.com/2010/10/30/last-quarter-apple-gained-4-unit-share-22-sales-value-share-and-48-of-profit-share/), in spite of commanding only 4% market share. Apple won both the unit share and profit share battle in MP3 players with the iPod, as no worthy competitor came forth. This is not the case in smart phones with the emergence of Android. Nonetheless, the Mac, with 35% of PC profit share in spite of only 7% market share, has proven that Apple’s model can thrive even in the face of strong competition.
bench_craft_companyYour daily cup of Orange and Blue Coffee - Horse Tracks.
Read our news of Jade Raymond making Splinter Cell 6.
Jonathon Shuler has published a post exploring the News Diamond from my Model for a 21st Century Newsroom. As part of that he's added an extra layer to th...
bench_craft_companyYour daily cup of Orange and Blue Coffee - Horse Tracks.
Read our news of Jade Raymond making Splinter Cell 6.
Jonathon Shuler has published a post exploring the News Diamond from my Model for a 21st Century Newsroom. As part of that he's added an extra layer to th...
bench_craft_company
